Zero Trust Architecture
Zero trust architecture protects each resource by checking the identity and context of every access request instead of treating a network location as trusted. It combines policy decisions, enforcement points, identity systems, device information, and monitoring to grant only the access needed for one session.
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Don't Panic
Don't Panic: Zero Trust Architecture
Zero trust architecture is the habit of asking a specific question before opening a specific door: may this subject perform this action on this resource, under these conditions, right now? The old perimeter model was more like issuing everyone inside the building a map to the whole building. It was convenient until the map escaped, which maps are prone to doing when nobody is looking.
The important unit is the resource: an application, service, data store, device, or workload. A request reaches a policy enforcement point, which asks the policy decision point to consider identity, device or workload posture, the requested action, resource sensitivity, and other current evidence. A previous approval is useful history, not a lifetime membership card.
This divides the machinery into a control plane and a data plane. The policy engine decides. The policy administrator establishes or ends the path. The policy enforcement point applies the result to traffic. Those names sound like a committee that needed another committee, but the split helps locate a failure. A bad decision, a broken path, and a bypass are different problems.
Identity matters, but it is not the whole answer. A valid account on an unhealthy device may need a different result. A healthy device does not give its user permission to administer every application. That is why a useful policy names a subject, action, resource, conditions, and duration. The grant should fit the request, not the network it came from.
There is no single zero trust topology waiting behind a tasteful dashboard. A gateway can protect a group of legacy systems. An identity-aware portal can front a web application. A workload proxy can protect one service calling another. Each placement changes the evidence available, the failure concentration, and the size of the blast radius. Buying a broker supplies neither an inventory nor a correct policy, alas.
Migration starts with one bounded path. Inventory its subjects, assets, resources, and flows. State what happens when identity, posture, policy distribution, or the decision point fails. Observe the path where possible, enforce it for a limited population, and expand when it is operable. The Field Notes tab covers the awkward operational details that turn neat diagrams into support work.
Read the intro for the full decision path and the limits of the model. Use the slides for the component relationships and migration loop. Keep the cheatsheet nearby when reviewing policy inputs, failures, and signals. Then use the practice reference and exercise to turn one small access request into an executable decision. The aim is not to distrust everything. It is to stop trusting location as an answer to a question it never knew how to ask.
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Sources
- https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/final
Supports
- Zero trust definition, tenets, resource focus, and limits of network-location trust
- Policy engine, policy administrator, policy enforcement point, control plane, and data plane
- Trust-algorithm inputs, deployment patterns, migration, threats, and availability considerations
- Quiz questions and explanations about architecture, context, enforcement, patterns, and product scope
- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-207.pdf
Supports
- Detailed logical-component responsibilities and access sequence
- Agent-gateway, enclave-gateway, resource-portal, and workload deployment patterns
- Failure behavior, cached access, policy-system threats, and clock considerations
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/zero_trust_maturity_model_v2_508.pdf
Supports
- Five maturity pillars and visibility, automation and orchestration, and governance capabilities
- Traditional, initial, advanced, and optimal maturity stages
- Dynamic policy, evidence integration, posture, telemetry, and April 2023 timeline milestone
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/M-22-09.pdf
Supports
- Federal strategy across identity, devices, networks, applications and workloads, and data
- January 2022 strategy milestone and program-oriented implementation outcomes
- https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/%28U%29ZT_RA_v2.0%28U%29_Sep22.pdf
Supports
- Mission-oriented capabilities, activities, relationships, and operational architecture
- Resource-specific availability and degraded-mode considerations
- September 2022 reference-architecture milestone
- https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3225919/department-of-defense-releases-zero-trust-strategy-and-roadmap/
Supports
- November 2022 DoD Zero Trust Strategy and Roadmap release date
- Strategy goals for adoption, secured systems, technology acceleration, and enablement
- https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/a/final
Supports
- Cloud-native and multi-cloud zero trust access-control model
- Identity-tier and network-tier policies, service meshes, and gateways
- September 2023 publication milestone
- https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/1800/35/final
Supports
- Implementing zero trust with nineteen example builds and common use cases
- Enhanced identity governance, microsegmentation, software-defined perimeter, and SASE implementation approaches
- Integration lessons and mappings to security standards
- https://research.google/pubs/beyondcorp-a-new-approach-to-enterprise-security/
Supports
- BeyondCorp removal of a privileged intranet and shift to user and device evidence
- 2014 production-architecture timeline milestone
- https://research.google/pubs/beyondcorp-design-to-deployment-at-google/
Supports
- Deployment experience and dynamic device trust tiers
- 2016 design-to-deployment timeline milestone
- https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/ipd
Supports
- September 2019 initial public draft date
- Draft scope covering logical components, deployment models, use cases, and migration
- https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cybersecurity-best-practices/executive-order-improving-nations-cybersecurity
Supports
- Executive Order 14028 zero trust adoption directive
- Relationship among the executive order, CISA maturity model, and OMB strategy
- May 2021 timeline milestone
- https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-04/bh-us-04-simmonds.pdf
Supports
- July 2004 de-perimeterisation presentation
- Shift from a hard perimeter toward data and system protection with interoperable controls
- https://collaboration.opengroup.org/jericho/commandments_v1.2.pdf
Supports
- May 2007 Jericho Forum Commandments version 1.2
- De-perimeterised design principles for identity, data, policy, and open networks
- https://www.forrester.com/webinar/No%2BMore%2BChewy%2BCenters%2BThe%2BZeroTrust%2BModel%2BOf%2BInformation%2BSecurity/WEB6741
Supports
- August 2010 Zero Trust model webinar and author
- Rejection of trusted-inside assumptions and distribution of security through infrastructure
- https://github.com/sindresorhus/awesome
Supports
- Starting catalog for required Awesome list discovery
- Discovery of the Awesome IAM list in the catalog
- https://github.com/kdeldycke/awesome-iam
Supports
- Discovery of Pomerium in the zero-trust network section
- Discovery of SPIFFE and SPIRE in the machine-identity section
- Discovery of Open Policy Agent and Keycloak in authorization and identity sections
- https://www.pomerium.com/docs/capabilities/authorization
Supports
- Pomerium as an identity-aware enforcement proxy
- Context-aware policy using identity, device identity, and external data
- Awesome Links rationale
- https://www.pomerium.com/docs/capabilities/authentication
Supports
- Pomerium integration with OpenID Connect identity providers
- Routing requests through a proxy to add authentication to applications
- https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs
Supports
- OPA as a general policy engine using structured input and policy as code
- Separation of policy decision-making from enforcement
- Awesome Links rationale and quiz explanation
- https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/management-introduction
Supports
- Distributed policy enforcement, policy bundles, decision logs, and status
- Policy-version and decision-consistency operational concerns
- https://spiffe.io/docs/latest/spiffe/concepts/
Supports
- SPIFFE IDs, trust domains, SVIDs, and workload identity
- Workload API delivery of identity documents and trust bundles
- Awesome Links rationale
- https://www.keycloak.org/documentation
Supports
- Keycloak identity and access management documentation
- OpenID Connect and SAML identity-provider role used in the Awesome Links rationale
- https://www.zscaler.com/products-and-solutions/zscaler-private-access
Supports
- Zscaler Private Access placement in private application access
- User, workload, and device access through a ZTNA service
- https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/
Supports
- Cloudflare One as a SASE platform combining enterprise networking and zero trust controls
- Request authentication and authorization using identity and context
- https://www.cloudflare.com/zero-trust/
Supports
- Cloudflare One product homepage used in the Landscape
- Identity-aware application access and security-service-edge placement
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/global-secure-access/quickstart-per-app-access
Supports
- Per-application access to private resources with connectors and the Global Secure Access client
- Conditional Access integration and segmented private-resource access
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/identity-access/microsoft-entra-private-access
Supports
- Microsoft Entra Private Access product homepage used in the Landscape
- https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/sase/access
Supports
- Prisma Access cloud-delivered secure access and private-access placement
- Product homepage used in the Landscape
- https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/secure-access/index.html
Supports
- Cisco Secure Access client and clientless ZTNA enforcement modes
- Identity context, private application access, routing, and policy enforcement
- https://www.netskope.com/netskope-one
Supports
- Netskope One convergence of SASE, security service edge, private access, and data security
- Product homepage used in the Landscape
- https://www.twingate.com/docs/architecture
Supports
- Twingate clients, connectors, controller, relays, resources, and authorization model
- Control and transport component placement used in the Landscape description
- https://www.twingate.com/
Supports
- Twingate product homepage used in the Landscape
- https://www.illumio.com/illumio-segmentation
Supports
- Microsegmentation across workloads, clouds, endpoints, and data centers
- Visibility, policy, and lateral-movement restriction in the Landscape description
- https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-language/
Supports
- Rego decision evaluation with JSON input for the zero trust exercise
- https://www.openpolicyagent.org/docs/latest/policy-testing/
Supports
- OPA test cases and CLI execution for allow and deny exercise criteria
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/preparing-beyondcorp-world-understanding-your-device-inventory
Supports
- Practitioner evidence that device posture draws from conflicting inventory and management sources
- Device-data authority, conflict resolution, staged rollout, and debugging considerations for Field Notes
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/inside-google-cloud/how-use-beyondcorp-ditch-your-vpn-improve-security-and-go-cloud
Supports
- BeyondCorp migration evidence on traffic and dependency discovery, support tooling, edge cases, and incremental migration
- https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/identity-security/applying-zero-trust-to-user-access-and-production-services
Supports
- Practitioner evidence that zero trust extends from user access to workload and production-service authorization
- Choke points, service identity, provenance, workload isolation, and blast-radius considerations for Field Notes
