Threat Hunting
Threat hunting is the practice of actively searching logs, endpoints, and network telemetry for adversary behavior that existing alerts missed. It complements detection by starting from a hypothesis about how an attacker could operate, then testing that hypothesis against collected data.
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Don't Panic
Don't Panic: Threat Hunting
Threat hunting is the deliberate search for adversary activity that has not already earned itself an alert. Detection waits for a rule to ring. Hunting starts with a question, which is less theatrical than a dashboard full of red lights and much more useful when the quiet is the problem.
The question is a hypothesis: if a specific adversary technique touched a specific asset, what evidence would exist, and can the available data show it? That small sentence keeps a hunt from becoming a ceremonial excavation of every log in reach. It also gives the work a way to fail honestly. No evidence might mean the behavior was absent. It might also mean the evidence was never collected, was not retained, or hid in a source nobody connected.
Most hunts begin in one of two places. A TTP-driven hunt starts with a behavior described in MITRE ATT&CK and asks whether it appears locally. An anomaly-driven hunt starts with normal behavior, then asks whether a deviation deserves a threat explanation. Indicators such as hashes, domains, and IP addresses are useful, but they age quickly and belong closer to threat intelligence and detection.
The useful unit is the loop: hypothesis, data and tooling, investigation, triage, outcome, and documentation. The investigation pivots across process, network, identity, and application context. A process can lead to its parent, command line, user, and connection. A network connection can lead back to the process that opened it. This is how a suspicious clue becomes an evidence chain rather than a dramatic anecdote.
A confirmed malicious finding goes to incident response. A repeatable pattern may become a detection, but only after someone owns it, tests its false-positive behavior, and defines what happens when it fires. A benign but notable result becomes a baseline. Noise is not a moral failure. It is a request to improve the question or query.
Start with one technique, one critical asset, and one or two data sources. The Practice tab turns that into a small synthetic investigation. The Cheatsheet keeps the pivots and outcome rules close by. Field Notes covers the parts that cost teams time when they are skipped. The Reference tab supplies the models and technique vocabulary for the next, sharper question.
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Sources
- https://www.sans.org/white-papers/37172/
Supports
- Threat hunting as hypothesis-driven, not data-driven, work
- Forming a question tied to assets, data sources, and threat models
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/
Supports
- ATT&CK as a knowledge base of observed adversary behavior
- Tactics, techniques, sub-techniques, and procedures; matrices and domains
- Detections, threat intelligence, adversary emulation, and assessment use cases
- The stated limits of group mappings and "don't shout bingo" guidance
- https://car.mitre.org/
Supports
- The Cyber Analytics Repository as analytics keyed to ATT&CK techniques and data sources
- Translating a hypothesis into a query against endpoint and network telemetry
- https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook
Supports
- A community-driven, open-source collection of detection logic and adversary tradecraft
- Detection development patterns mapped to ATT&CK
- https://medium.com/@palantir/alerting-and-detection-strategy-framework-52dc33722df2
Supports
- The Alerting and Detection Strategy framework structure for goal, metadata, severity, false-positive handling, and response guidance
- https://github.com/0x4D31/awesome-threat-detection
Supports
- Discovery of MITRE ATT&CK Navigator, MITRE CAR, the ThreatHunter Playbook, Sigma, and YARA as ecosystem resources
- https://sustainability.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-martin/rms/documents/cyber/LM-White-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf
Supports
- The 2011 Intelligence-Driven Defense paper and its Cyber Kill Chain model
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/faq/
Supports
- ATT&CK started in 2013 to document adversary behavior against Windows enterprise networks
- https://www.sans.org/white-papers/who-what-where-when-why-how-effective-threat-hunting
Supports
- The 2016 focused and iterative threat hunting model
- https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/hunter-strikes-back-2017-threat-hunting-survey-37760
Supports
- The 2017 SANS threat hunting survey
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/versions/
Supports
- ATT&CK version milestones from v1.0 through v9.0
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-october-2018/
Supports
- The 2018 transition to the versioned ATT&CK site and STIX/TAXII data
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-july-2020/
Supports
- Enterprise ATT&CK sub-techniques in the July 2020 release
- https://attack.mitre.org/resources/updates/updates-october-2020/
Supports
- Reconnaissance and Resource Development additions in the October 2020 release
- https://www.elastic.co/pdf/elastic-guide-to-threat-hunting
Supports
- Data completeness, consistency, and timeliness as prerequisites for useful hunting
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/advanced-hunting-overview
Supports
- Query-based hunting across Microsoft Defender XDR data
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-xdr/custom-detection-rules
Supports
- Validating advanced hunting queries before turning them into custom detections
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ES/8.1.0/User/GetStarted
Supports
- Splunk Enterprise Security investigation and response workflows
- https://cloud.google.com/security/products/security-operations
Supports
- Google Security Operations as a security operations platform
- https://www.elastic.co/docs/solutions/security/investigate
Supports
- Timeline, event correlation, process analysis, and case documentation in Elastic Security
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/platform/threat-intelligence/adversary-overwatch/
Supports
- Managed threat hunting across endpoint, identity, cloud, and SIEM data
- https://www.sentinelone.com/platform/endpoint-protection-platform/
Supports
- Correlation of process, file, network, and identity events in SentinelOne Singularity
