AI Application Security
AI application security protects systems that combine language models with software, data sources, tools, and infrastructure. It addresses threats specific to AI components, including prompt injection, context leakage, unsafe model outputs, and the trust boundaries between probabilistic models and deterministic code.
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Don't Panic
Don't Panic — AI Application Security
AI application security is the discipline of keeping a language model from turning a helpful sentence into an unhelpful incident. The model is only one resident of a crowded building: prompts, retrieved documents, tools, identities, logs, data stores, and downstream services all have keys to something. Securing the model alone is rather like installing an excellent lock on a door while leaving the windows, filing cabinet, and delivery chute on a first-name basis with the street.
The durable idea is a deterministic security envelope around a probabilistic component. Models are good at interpreting language and proposing work. They are not dependable policy engines. A document can be useful evidence and also contain an instruction that changes the model's behavior. A generated tool call can sound sensible and still point at the wrong tenant. The surrounding application must make the decisions that require certainty: who may see a record, which action is permitted, and whether an effect may happen now.
This produces one slightly alarming but useful rule: similarity is not authorization. Retrieval can find a relevant document without establishing that the current subject may receive it. A system prompt can describe the intended behavior without enforcing it. A guardrail can reduce bad behavior without granting a safe credential. The surprise is that an AI security failure often begins as ordinary text, then becomes important only when a separate system gives it authority. Language is not malicious by itself. Language with a shared administrator token has ambitions.
Start with the Course tab for the full path from prompts and retrieval to output handling, tools, supply chains, data, and cost limits. The Cheatsheet is the compact map for threat surfaces, boundary questions, and release gates. Field Notes covers the operational traps that arrive after the diagram looks complete. The Reference tab supplies the standards and threat knowledge for turning those controls into a tested program.
The point is not to force models into perfect obedience. That would be a long meeting with mathematics and, eventually, disappointment. The point is to make failure small, visible, and reversible. Keep permissions narrow. Validate outputs for their destination. Bind approval to the actual target and arguments. Record enough evidence to investigate. Then a model can still make a strange suggestion without acquiring the authority to make it a strange afternoon.
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Sources
- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-218A.pdf
Supports
- AI systems inherit conventional software risk while blurring boundaries between code, data, and natural-language interaction
- Secure development practices for model, data, pipeline, integration, versioning, lineage, and shared responsibility
- Risk-based adaptation of secure development practices across producers and acquirers
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/guidelines-secure-ai-system-development/guidelines
Supports
- Secure design, development, deployment, operation, and maintenance as one AI system lifecycle
- Threat modeling, supply-chain security, infrastructure protection, incident management, logging, monitoring, and updates
- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ai/NIST.AI.600-1.pdf
Supports
- Generative AI risk management through Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage outcomes
- Direct and indirect prompt injection and the expanding AI attack surface
- Threat modeling, red teaming, empirically validated testing, monitoring, privacy, provenance, and incident response
- https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/
Supports
- The 2025 application risk taxonomy for prompt injection, disclosure, supply chain, poisoning, output handling, agency, prompt leakage, retrieval, misinformation, and consumption
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/
Supports
- Direct, indirect, and multimodal prompt injection paths
- Retrieval and fine-tuning as incomplete prompt-injection mitigations
- Least privilege, application-owned credentials, and approval for high-risk actions
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm022025-sensitive-information-disclosure/
Supports
- Sensitive information exposure through model inputs, training data, application context, and outputs
- Data sanitization, user controls, and the limits of prompt-based restrictions
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm032025-supply-chain/
Supports
- Supply-chain risk across models, adapters, data, packages, and deployment platforms
- Source verification, integrity checks, inventories, patching, evaluation, and monitoring
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm042025-data-and-model-poisoning/
Supports
- Poisoning of pre-training, fine-tuning, and embedding data as an integrity risk
- Provenance, validation, version control, anomaly detection, isolation, and adversarial testing
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm052025-improper-output-handling/
Supports
- Model output as attacker-influenced input to downstream systems
- Destination-specific validation, sanitization, encoding, and risks including injection and code execution
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm062025-excessive-agency/
Supports
- Agency through tools and connected systems
- Excessive functionality, permission, and autonomy as independent impact factors
- Read-only scopes, user-bound identities, approval, and rate limiting
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm072025-system-prompt-leakage/
Supports
- System prompts as unsuitable storage for secrets or strict authorization rules
- Security enforcement outside the model even when prompt behavior can be inferred
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm082025-vector-and-embedding-weaknesses/
Supports
- Unauthorized access, cross-context leaks, poisoning, and behavior alteration in retrieval systems
- Access control, tenant isolation, provenance, and validation for retrieval content
- https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm102025-unbounded-consumption/
Supports
- Uncontrolled inference as a cause of denial of service, financial loss, model theft, and degradation
- Input limits, quotas, rate controls, timeouts, and resource monitoring
- https://atlas.mitre.org/
Supports
- A living knowledge base of tactics, techniques, mitigations, and case studies for predictive, generative, and agentic AI
- Techniques involving prompt injection, retrieval content, data poisoning, model compromise, tool use, credential access, and exfiltration
- https://owasp.org/www-project-ai-testing-guide/
Supports
- Repeatable trustworthiness testing across application, model, infrastructure, and data layers
- Testing needs created by nondeterministic model behavior and AI-specific attacks
- https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/15/2003439257/-1/-1/0/CSI-DEPLOYING-AI-SYSTEMS-SECURELY.PDF
Supports
- Threat models, security boundaries, trusted data sources, zero-trust architecture, and deployment hardening
- Artifact integrity, adversarial testing, API input controls, behavior monitoring, incident response, and rollback
- Protection of model weights, logs, outputs, credentials, networks, and infrastructure
- https://media.defense.gov/2025/May/22/2003720601/-1/-1/0/CSI_AI_DATA_SECURITY.PDF
Supports
- Data security across planning, collection, model building, validation, deployment, operation, and monitoring
- Provenance, integrity, authenticity, minimization, access control, encryption, validation, auditing, and deletion
- Dataset verification and protection against unauthorized modification and supply-chain compromise
- https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8269-draft.pdf
Supports
- NIST's 2019 draft taxonomy of adversarial machine learning attacks, defenses, and consequences
- https://www.mitre.org/news-insights/impact-story/mitre-atlas-takes-ai-system-theft
Supports
- MITRE's June 2021 release of ATLAS version 2.0 and its ATT&CK-style AI threat matrix
- https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework/ai-risk-management-framework-engage
Supports
- NIST's July 2021 request for information initiating AI RMF development
- https://www.nist.gov/publications/artificial-intelligence-risk-management-framework-ai-rmf-10
Supports
- NIST AI RMF 1.0 publication on January 26, 2023 and its Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage functions
- https://genai.owasp.org/2023/05/04/owasp-top-10-for-llms-hits-major-milestone-with-release-of-v0-5/
Supports
- OWASP's May 2023 version 0.5 milestone for the Top 10 for LLM Applications
- https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10-2023-24/
Supports
- OWASP's 2023-2024 LLM Top 10 risks, vulnerabilities, and mitigations
- https://openai.com/safety/prompt-injections/
Supports
- Broad agent instructions can make harmful prompt-injection outcomes easier when untrusted content is in context
- User confirmations and limited access are defense layers for consequential agent actions
- https://www.lakera.ai/
Supports
- Lakera's AI agent runtime protection for prompt attacks and data leakage
- https://www.hiddenlayer.com/
Supports
- HiddenLayer's AI security platform for AI assets, supply-chain security, and runtime protection
- https://support.calypsoai.com/en/articles/10245110-platform-overview
Supports
- CalypsoAI scanners for prompt injection and sensitive-data protection around LLM interactions
- https://www.cisco.com/site/us/en/products/security/ai-defense/index.html
Supports
- Cisco AI Defense's discovery, validation, and runtime protection for AI models and applications
- https://www.wiz.io/
Supports
- Wiz's cloud security posture coverage for AI workloads and connected cloud resources
